

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 104991

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 1759 ACTION SECSTATE DATED
APRIL 21, 1978.

QUOTE: S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 1759

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PPDC, PDEV, TZ, US
SUBJECT: NYERERE LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER

1. HERewith TEXT OF LETTER FROM PSIDENT NYERERE TO PRESIDENT
CARTER DATED APRIL 20. ORIGINAL WILL BE DELIVERED BY
TANZANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. BEGIN TEXT. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A.

DEAR PRESIDENT CARTER,

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 104991

THANK YOU FOR THE LETTER YOU SENT TO ME AFTER YOUR VISIT
TO NIGERIA. I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR FROM AMBASSADOR SALIM,
AND LATER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GARBA, OF THE GREAT SUCCESS
OF THAT VISIT - WHICH WE HAD BEEN FOLLOWING BY RADIO WITH
CONSIDERABLE INTEREST.

3. THANK YOU ALSO FOR SENDING SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE TO
DAR ES SALAAM LAST WEEKEND FOR THE MEETING W
TH THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT. HIS PRESENCE WAS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE HIGH PRIORITY

WHICH YOU GIVE TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND IT WAS GOOD TO HAVE THIS FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN AFFAIRS WITH HIM.

4. I AM SURE YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED FULL REPORTS FROM MR. VANCE AND FROM AMBASSADOR SPAIN ABOUT THE MEETINGS HERE. I WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO PUT ON PAPER MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THE MORE ESPECIALLY AS I WAS - AND INDEED STILL REMAIN - PUZZLED BY THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH WAS ISSUED AT THE END AND BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE A DELIBERATE DOWN-PLAYING OF THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS AT DAR ES SALAAM BY THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS AND RADIO.

5. AT THE FIRST MEETING ON THE FRIDAY EVENING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE DELIBERATELY NEGATIVE, AND THE OUTLOOK AT THAT POINT SEEMED BLEAK. BUT AT THE SATURDAY AFTERNOON MEETING THEY MADE CLEAR THEIR NEW POSITION. THEY THEN ACCEPTED ALMOST ALL THE POINTS WHICH THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE HAD IN THE MORNING DESCRIBED TO ME AS BEING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. THUS: THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AGREED THAT, DURING THE INTERIM, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD HAVE BOTH RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER OVER DEFENSE AND OVER LAW AND ORDER. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALSO AGREED ON A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE TERRITORY,
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 104991

AND INDEED CALLED FOR IT TO PLAY A ROLE IN POLICE WORK AS WELL AS TAKING OVER THE INTERNAL DUTIES OF THE SMITH ARMY AND SUPERVISING THE ELECTIONS. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MENTIONED BY EITHER SIDE DURING THE MEETING; AS I UNDERSTAND IT THIS WAS BECAUSE EVERYONE ACCEPTS THAT IT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED THAT THESE ARE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER.

6. DISAGREEMENT REMAINED ON TWO POINTS. THE FIRST WAS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLICE DURING THE INTERIM. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AN IMPORTANT MATTER - NOT LEAST TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT - AND HAS TO BE CLEARED UP. BUT I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT IT IS REALLY AS IMPORTANT TO YOUR SIDE AS IS CURRENTLY BEING CLAIMED. FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS ACCEPTED THAT THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER HAS EXECUTIVE POWER OVER LAW AND ORDER. UNDER THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THE POLICE FORCE WHICH HE WILL BE USING IN EXERCISING THIS FUNCTION IS THE ENEMY'S POLICE FORCE, AND IT IS NOW IDENTIFIED ALSO WITH THE 'INTERNAL NATIONALISTS.' WHAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS SAYING (AND IT SEEMS TO ME RIGHTLY SO) IS THAT THE POLICE CAN NO LONGER BE REGARDED AS BEING NEUTRAL BETWEEN THE GROUPS WHICH WILL BE COMPETING IN THE ELECTIONS - AND WHICH MAY GET INTO CONFLICT BEFORE THAT. IN THAT CONTEXT IT IS NOT ILLEGITIMATE TO ASK LORD CARVER WHAT POLICE HE WILL BE USING TO CARRY OUT POLICE DUTIES FAIRLY, AND FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO CLAIM SOME INVOLVEMENT IN THIS WORK. THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED HONESTLY.

7. THE OTHER UNSOLVED PROBLEM IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL. I GATHER THAT THE POWERS OF THIS COUNCIL WERE NOT DISCUSSED IN DAR ES SALAAM, EXCEPT INsofar AS THEY WERE SETTLED BY IMPLICATION IN THE AGREEMENT THAT THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER SHULD HAVE EXECUTIVE POWER ON THE MATTERS SET OUT IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

8. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL WAS DISCUSSED,
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 104991

AND NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. BUT I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS NOW THAT THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER'S POWERS ON THE VITAL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED - AND NEITHER MR. VANCE NOR DR. OWEN HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A 'FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE'. THE COMPOSITION OF THIS COUNCIL IS CERTAINLY THE KIND OF QUESTION WHICH CAN CAUSE INTENSE BARGAINING AT THE END OF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS - BUT IT WOULD REALLY BE BARGAINING BETWEEN NATIONALISTS, WITH OUTSIDERS PERHAPS HAVING TO COME IN AND KNOCK HEADS TOGETHER IN ORDER THAT IT SHOULD NOT SABOTAGE EARLIER AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ISSUES* THIS IS THEREFORE THE ONE ISSUE ABOVE ALL OTHERS WHICH I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT COULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED UNTIL THE FULL CONFERENCE TAKES PLACE. LET ME ADD THAT IN SAYING THIS I AM NOT QUESTIONING MR. VANCE'S CONCERN FOR BOTH FAIRNESS AND THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS DURING THE INTERIM. I DO REALIZE THAT BOTH ARE CENTRAL TO AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. MY POINT IS THAT (A) THE GOVERNING COUNCIL'S COMPOSITION OF LESS IMPORTANCE THE MORE CLEAR AND THE MORE WIDESPREAD ARE THE AGREED POWERS OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND THE U.N. FORCE; AND (B) IF BY ANY CHANCE ALL THE NATIONALISTS COULD AGREE ON THE OMPOSITION OF THIS COUNCIL THE REST OF US WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CONCERNED AT ALL, SO WE CAN AT LEAST LEAVE THIS QUESTION OPEN UNTIL THEY ALL MEET AT THE PROJECTED FUTURE CONFERENCE.

9. WHAT ALL THIS MEANS IS THAT AT DAR ES SALAAM AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND YOURSELVES ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, DESPITE CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT ON TWO IMPORTANT MATTERS AND SOME LACK OF CLARITY ON INTERPRETATION AT OTHER POINTS. FOR THREE REASONS I URGED THAT THIS ADVANCE SHOULD BE STATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. MY PURPOSE WAS FIRSTLY TO COMMIT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PUBLICLY TO THEIR CHANGE OF POSITION; SECONDLY TO UNDERCUT
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 104991

THE CONTINUING SUSPICION IN AFRICA ABOUT WHETHER BRITAIN AND AMERICA ARE REALLY COMMITTED TO THE PROPOSALS; AND THIRDLY TO SHOW THE 'INTERNAL NATIONALISTS' AND SMITH THAT IT IS ONLY THEY WHO ARE PREVENTING AN END TO THE WAR AND INDEPENDENCE

ON THE BASIS OF MAJORITY RULE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE A REAL CHOICE TO THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE BECAUSE THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED ARE FAIR TO ALL THE CONTENDING PARTIES. THE INCLUSION OF THE POINTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED WOULD, AS I SAW IT, LEAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN SALISBURY TO DR. OWEN AND MR. VANCE.

10. YET ALTHOUGH THE JOINT STATEMENT DID NOT STATE THEM (INDEED IT SEEMS TO BE TO BE POSITIVELY MISLEADING), THE FACTS REMAIN. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DID ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THE POWER OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OVER DEFENCE, LAW AND ORDER, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE ELECTIONS. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE DURING THE INTERIM. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THIS AMOUNTED TO A SUCCESS FOR THE DAR ES SALAAM CONFERENCE*

11. THE BIG QUESTION AGAIN IS WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? I UNDERSTAND THAT DAVID OWEN AND MR. VANCE HAVE SOME HOPE THAT IN A SHORT WHILE THE PRESSURES ON SMITH AND THE 'INTERNAL NATIONALISTS' WILL BRING THEM TO A FULL CONFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. ALTERNATIVELY, I GATHER THAT THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT THE 'INTERNAL AGREEMENT' MAY BREAK DOWN AND BISHOP MUZOREWA THEN RETURN TO HIS PREVIOUS SUPPORT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. OBVIOUSLY A FEW WEEKS IS GOING TO ELAPSE BEFORE EITHER OF THESE THINGS HAPPENS. SO WHAT DO WE DO IN THE MEANTIME?

12. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL IS THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN ALL PRESSURES ON THE SALISBURY REGIME. UNLESS WE DO SO NEITHER OF THE HOPED FOR DEVELOPMENTS WILL OCCUR. TANZANIA WILL PLAY ITS PART IN THIS. I BELIEVE IT TO BE IMPORTANT ALSO THAT WE DO LET BISHOP MUZOREWA KNOW OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 104991

REACHED IN DAR ES SALAAM, AND CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO PULL BACK FROM DISASTER BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

13. FOR IT THERE IS NO CONFERENCE, AND THE BISHOP DOES NOT PULL OUT FROM THE SALISBURY REGIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THEN I SEE NOTHING BEFORE US EXCEPT WAR, AND A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL BE BASED ON A MILITARY VICTORY. IT IS MY DESIRE TO SHORTEN THAT WAR THAT HAS CAUSED ME TO URGE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON EVERYONE, IN SEASON AND OUT OF SEASON. BUT I CAN ONLY URGE; NEGOTIATIONS HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED BY OTHERS. AND IF, IN THE END, THE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL FOR ANY REASON AT ALL I SHALL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY ON SUPPORTING THE FRONT. THE ONE THING I CANNOT DO IS ACCEPT A CONTINUATION OF MINORITY RACIALIST RULE IN RHODESIA.

14. MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE BEEN FRANK IN THIS LETTER AS BEFITS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES IN A JOINT UNDERTAKING. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU WILL MISUNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE

OF THIS LETTER, OR DOUBT MY DESIRE THAT TANZANIAN SHOULD BE
ABLE TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM IN ZIMBABWE.

15. PLEASE BE ASSURED IN ANY CASE THAT THIS LETTER COMES TO
YOU WITH VERY WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES.
YOURS SINCERELY, JULIUS K. NYERERE. END TEXT.
SPAIN UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

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